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Abstract Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to pro-
mote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward
and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated,
mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasaki et al. (2012, Proc
Natl Acad Sci USA 109:1165–1169) considered optional participation as well as in-
stitutional incentives and described how the interplay between these mechanisms af-
fects the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Here, we present a full clas-
sification of these evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, whenever penalties are large
enough to cause the bi-stability of both cooperation and defection in cases in which
participation in the public good game is compulsory, these penalties will ultimately
result in cooperation if participation in the public good game is optional. The global
stability of coercion-based cooperation in this optional case contrasts strikingly with
the bi-stability that is observed in the compulsory case. We also argue that optional
participation is not so effective at improving cooperation under rewards.
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2 Tatsuya Sasaki
1 Introduction
Self-interest often leads to freeloading on the contributions of others in the dynamics
associated with common goods and joint enterprises [1,2]. As is well known, incen-
tivization, such as rewarding and punishing, is a popular method for harnessing the
selfish action and for motivating individuals to behave cooperatively [3–13]. Exper-
imental and theoretical studies on joint enterprises under various incentive schemes
are growing [14–22].
Obviously, whether rewards or penalties, sufficiently large incentives can trans-
form freeloaders into full cooperators, and incentives with small impact do nothing
on the outcomes [22]. However, incentivizing is costly, and such heavy incentives
often incurs serious costs on those who provide the incentives, whether in a peer-
to-peer or institutional manner. Previous game-theoretic studies on the evolution of
cooperation with incentives have focused on public good games with compulsory par-
ticipation, and revealed that the intermediate degrees of punishment lead to a couple
of stable equilibria, full defection and full cooperation [4,5,10,13,22,23]. In this bi-
stable dynamic, establishing full cooperation requires an initially sufficient fraction
of cooperators, or ex ante adjustment to overcome the initial condition [10,23]. This
situation is a coordination game [24], which is a model of great interest for analyzing
a widespread coordination problem (e.g., in choosing distinct technical standards).
In contrast to a traditional case with compulsory participation, another approach
to the evolution of cooperation is an option to opt out of joint enterprises [25–37].
The opting-out option can make the freeloader problem relaxed: individuals can exit
a joint venture when stuck in a state in which all freeload off one another (“economic
stalemate”), and then pursue a stand-alone project; if a joint venture with mutual co-
operation is more profitable than in isolation, the individuals once exited will switch
to contributing to the venture. This situation, however, will also find defection attrac-
tive. Thus, joint enterprises with optional participation can give rise to a rock-paper-
scissors cycle [28–31].
Recently, Sasaki et al. [22] revealed that considering optional participation as well
as institutional incentives can effect fully cooperative outcomes for the intermediate
ranges of incentives. They demonstrated that opting-out combined with rewarding
is not very effective at establishing full cooperation, but opting-out combined with
punishment is very effective at establishing cooperation. Although there are a series
of existing papers on the interplay of punishment and opting-out mechanisms [38–
44], the main points of these earlier studies comprise solving the puzzling issue of
second-order freeloading: the exploitation of the efforts of others to uphold incentives
for cooperation [2, 4, 7, 45, 46]. Sasaki et al. [22] consider incentives controlled
exclusively by a centralized authority (like the empire or state) [47–50], and thus,
their model is already free from the second-order freeloader problem.
Here we analytically provide a full classification of the replicator dynamics in a
public good game with institutional incentives and optional participation. We clarify
when and how cooperation can be selected over defection in a bi-stable situation as-
sociated with institutional punishment without requiring any ability to communicate
among individuals. In particular, assuming that the penalties are large enough to cause
bi-stability with both full cooperation and full defection (no matter what the basins
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of attraction are) in cases of compulsory participation, cooperation will necessarily
become selected in the long term, regardless of the initial conditions.
2 Model
2.1 Social dilemmas
To describe our institutional-incentive model, we start from public good games with
group size n ≥ 2. The n players in a group are given the opportunity to participate in
a public good game. We assume that participation pays a fixed entrance fee σ > 0 to
the sanctioning institution, whereas non-participation yields nothing. We denote by
m the number of players who are willing to participate (0≤m≤ n) and assume that at
least two participants are required for the game to occur [28,39–42]. If the game does
take place, each of the m participants in the group can decide whether to invest a fixed
amount c > 0 into a common pool, knowing that each contribution will be multiplied
by r > 1 and then shared equally among all m− 1 other participants in the group.
Thus, participants have no direct gain from their own investments [6,41–43,45]. If all
of the participants invest, they obtain a net payoff (r−1)c > 0. The game is a social
dilemma, which is independent of the value of r, because participants can improve
their payoffs by withholding their contribution.
Let us next assume that the total incentive stipulated by a sanctioning institution
is proportional to the group size m and hence of the form mδ , where δ > 0 is the
(potential) per capita incentive. If rewards are employed to incentivize cooperation,
these funds will be shared among the so-called “cooperators” who contribute (see
[51] for a voluntary reward fund). Hence, each cooperator will obtain a bonus that
is denoted by mδ/nC, where nC denotes the number of cooperators in the group of
m participants. If penalties are employed to incentivize cooperation, “defectors” who
do not contribute will analogously have their payoffs reduced by mδ/nD, where nD
denotes the number of defectors in the group of m players (m = nC+nD).
We consider an infinitely large and well-mixed population of players, from which
n samples are randomly selected to form a group for each game. Our analysis of the
underlying evolutionary game is based especially on the replicator dynamics [52] for
the three corresponding strategies of the cooperator, defector, and non-participant,
with respective frequencies x, y, and z. The combination of all possible values of
(x,y,z) with x,y,z≥ 0 and x+y+ z = 1 forms the triangular state space ∆. We denote
by C, D, and N the three vertices of ∆ that correspond to the three homogeneous
states in which all cooperate (x = 1), defect (y = 1), or are non-participants (z = 1),
respectively. For ∆, the replicator dynamics are defined by
x˙ = x(PsC− P¯
s), y˙ = y(PsD− P¯
s), z˙ = z(PsN− P¯
s), (1)
where P¯s denotes the average payoff in the entire population; PsC, P
s
D, and P
s
N de-
note the expected payoff values for cooperators, defectors, and non-participants, re-
spectively; and s = o, r,p is used to specify one of three different incentive schemes,
namely, “without incentives,” “with rewards,” and “with punishment,” respectively.
Because non-participants have a payoff of 0, PsN = 0, and thus, P¯
s = xPsC+ yP
s
D.
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We note that if (r− 1)c > σ , the three edges of the state space δ form a hetero-
clinic cycle without incentives: N→ C→ D→ N (Figs. 2a or 3a). Defectors domi-
nate cooperators because of the cost of contribution c, and non-participants dominate
defectors because of the cost of participation σ . Finally, cooperators dominate non-
participants because of the net benefit from the public good game with (r−1)c > σ .
In the interior of ∆, all of the trajectories originate from and converge to N, which
is a non-hyperbolic equilibrium. Hence, cooperation can emerge only in brief bursts,
sparked by random perturbations [29,41].
2.2 Pay-offs
Here, we calculate the average payoff for the whole population and the expected
payoff values for cooperators and defectors. In a group with m− 1 co-participants
(m = 2, . . . ,n), a defector or a cooperator obtains from the public good game an aver-
age payoff of rcx/(1− z) [41]. Hence,
PoD =
(
rc
x
1− z
−σ
)
(1− zn−1). (2)
Note that zn−1 is the probability of finding no co-players and, thus, of being reduced
to non-participation. In addition, cooperators contribute c with a probability 1−zn−1,
and thus, PoC−P
o
D =−c(1− z
n−1). Hence, P¯o = (1− zn−1)[(r−1)cx−σ(1− z)].
We now turn to the cases with institutional incentives. First, we consider penalties.
Because cooperators never receive penalties, we have P
p
C=P
o
C. In a group in which the
m−1 co-participants include k cooperators (and thus, m−1−k defectors), switching
from defecting to cooperating implies avoiding the penalty mδ/(m− k). Hence,
P
p
C−P
p
D = (P
o
C−P
o
D)+
n
∑
m=2
(
n−1
m−1
)
(1− z)m−1zn−m
×
[
m−1
∑
k=0
(
m−1
k
)(
x
1− z
)k(
y
1− z
)m−1−k
mδ
m− k
]
= −(c−δ )(1− zn−1)+δ
x(1− (1− y)n−1
y
, (3)
and thus,
P¯p = P¯o−δ [y(1− zn−1)+ x(1− (1− y)n−1)]
= (1− zn−1)((r−1)cx−σ(1− z)−δy)−δx(1− (1− y)n−1). (4)
Next, we consider rewards. It is now the defectors who are unaffected, implying
PrD = P
o
D. In a group with m− 1 co-participants, including k cooperators, switching
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from defecting to cooperating implies obtaining the reward mδ/(k+1). Hence,
PrC−P
r
D = (P
o
C−P
o
D)+
n
∑
m=2
(
n−1
m−1
)
(1− z)m−1zn−m
×
[
m−1
∑
k=0
(
m−1
k
)(
x
1− z
)k(
y
1− z
)m−1−k
mδ
k+1
]
= −(c−δ )(1− zn−1)+δ
y(1− (1− x)n−1
x
, (5)
and thus,
P¯r = P¯o+δ [x(1− zn−1)+ y(1− (1− x)n−1)]
= (1− zn−1)((r−1)cx−σ(1− z)+δx)−δy(1− (1− x)n−1). (6)
3 Results
3.1 Coordination and coexistence
We investigated the interplay of institutional incentives and optional participation. As
a first step, we considered replicator dynamics along the three edges of the state space
∆. On the DN-edge (x = 0), this dynamic is always D → N because the payoff for
non-participating is better than that for defecting by at least the participation fee σ ,
regardless of whether penalties versus rewards are in place. On the NC-edge (y = 0),
it is obvious that if the public good game is too expensive (i.e., if σ ≥ (r−1)c, under
penalties or σ ≥ (r− 1)c+ δ , under rewards), players will opt for non-participation
more than cooperation. Indeed, N becomes a global attractor because z˙ > 0 holds in
∆ \ {z = 0}. We do not consider further cases but assume that the dynamic of the
NC-edge is always N→ C.
On the CD-edge (z = 0), the dynamic corresponds to compulsory participation,
and Eq. (1) reduces to x˙ = x(1− x)(PsC−P
s
D). Clearly, both of the ends C (x = 1) and
D (x = 0) are fixed points. Under penalties, the term for the payoff difference is
P
p
C−P
p
D =−c+δ
1− xn
1− x
=−c+δ
n−1
∑
i=0
xi. (7)
Under rewards, it is
PrC−P
r
D =−c+δ
1− (1− x)n
x
=−c+δ
n−1
∑
i=0
(1− x)i. (8)
Because δ > 0, PrC−P
r
D strictly decreases, and P
p
C−P
p
D strictly increases, with x. The
condition under which there exists an interior equilibrium R on the CD-edge is
δ− < δ < δ+, with δ− =
c
n
and δ+ = c. (9)
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Fig. 1 Compulsory public good games with institutional incentives. The location of stable and unstable
equilibria (thick continuous lines and dashed lines, respectively) and the direction of evolution (dotted
arrows) vary, depending on the per capita incentive, δ . For very small and sufficiently large values of
δ , full defection (x = 0) and full cooperation (x = 1) are the final outcomes, respectively. This applies to
both incentives considered. Intermediate values of δ impact evolutionary dynamics in a strikingly different
way, as follows. a Punishment. When δ increases beyond a threshold δ−, an unstable interior equilibrium
enters the state space at x = 1, moves left, and eventually exits it at x = 0 for δ = δ+. b Rewards. When
δ increases beyond a threshold δ−, a (globally) stable interior equilibrium enters the state space at x = 0,
moves right, and eventually exits it at x = 1 for δ = δ+. Consequently, for the interval δ− < δ < δ+ (gray-
colored region), punishment results in bi-stability of both the pure states; rewards lead to a stable mixture
independent of the initial state. Parameters: n = 5, r = 3, c = 1, and σ = 0.5.
Next, we summarize the game dynamics for compulsory public good games (Fig.
1). For such a small δ that δ < δ−, defection is a unique outcome; D is globally stable,
and C is unstable. For such a large δ that δ > δ+, cooperation is a unique outcome;
C is globally stable, and D is unstable. For the intermediate values of δ , cooperation
evolves in different ways under penalties versus rewards, as follows. Under penalties
(Fig. 1a), as δ crosses the threshold δ−, C becomes stable, and an unstable interior
equilibrium R splits off from C. The point R separates the basins of attraction of
C and D. Penalties cause bi-stable competition between cooperators and defectors,
which is often exhibited as a coordination game [24]; one or the other norm will
become established, but there can be no coexistence. With increasing δ , the basin of
attraction of D becomes increasingly smaller, until δ attains the value of δ+. Here, R
merges with the formerly stable D, which becomes unstable.
In contrast, under rewards (Fig. 1b), as δ crosses a threshold δ−, D becomes
unstable, and a stable interior equilibrium R splits off from D. The point R is a global
attractor. Rewards give rise to the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors,
which is a typical result in a snowdrift game [53]. As δ increases, the fraction of
cooperators within the stable coexistence becomes increasingly larger. Finally, as δ
reaches another threshold δ+, R merges with the formerly unstable C, which becomes
stable. We note that δ+ and δ− have the same value, regardless of whether we take
into account rewards or penalties.
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3.2 Uniqueness of the interior equilibrium Q
Now, we consider the interior of the state space ∆. We start by proving that, for n > 2,
if an equilibrium Q exists in the interior, it is unique. For this purpose, we introduce
the coordinate system ( f ,z) in ∆ \ {z = 1}, with f = x/(x+ y), and we rewrite Eq.
(1) as
f˙ = f (1− f )(PsC−P
s
D), z˙ =−zP¯
s. (10)
Dividing the right-hand side of Eq. (10) by 1− zn−1, which is positive in ∆\{z= 1},
corresponds to a change in velocity and does not affect the orbits in ∆ [52]. Using
Eqs. (3)–(6), this transforms Eq. (10) into the following. Under penalties, Eq. (10)
becomes
f˙ = f (1− f )[−c+δ +δ f H( f ,z)],
z˙ = z(1− z)[σ +δ − ((r−1)c+δ ) f +δ f (1− f )H( f ,z)], (11)
whereas under rewards, it becomes
f˙ = f (1− f )[−c+δ +δ (1− f )H(1− f ,z)],
z˙ = z(1− z)[σ − ((r−1)c+δ ) f +δ f (1− f )H(1− f ,z)], (12)
where
H( f ,z) =
1− [ f +(1− f )z]n−1
(1− f )(1− zn−1)
=
1+[ f +(1− f )z]+ · · ·+[ f +(1− f )z]n−2
1+ z+ · · ·+ zn−2
.
(13)
Note that H( f ,0) = ∑n−2i=0 f
i and H( f ,1) = 1.
At an interior equilibrium Q = ( fQ,zQ), the three different strategies must have
equal payoffs, which, in our model, means that they all must equal 0. The conditions
PoC = P
p
C = 0 under penalties and P
o
D = P
r
D = 0 under rewards imply that fQ is given
by
fQ(p) =
c+σ
rc
under penalties and fQ(r) =
σ
rc
under rewards. (14)
respectively. Thus, if it exists, the interior equilibrium Q must be located on the line
given by f = fQ. From Eqs. (11) and (12), Q must satisfy
H( f ,z) =
c−δ
δ f
under penalties and H(1− f ,z) =
c−δ
δ (1− f )
under rewards. (15)
In the specific case when n = 2, by solving Eqs. (14) and (15) with H( f ,z) = 1,
we can see that the dynamic has an interior equilibrium only when δ = rc2/((r +
1)c+σ) under penalties or δ = rc2/(2rc−σ) under rewards. At this moment, the
aforementioned line consists of a continuum of equilibria and connects R and N (Fig.
4). This is a degenerate case of the interior equilibrium, but in Sasaki et al. [22], this
case was not clearly distinguished from the general form described below.
We next show that zQ is uniquely determined in the general case for n > 2. Both
equations in Eq. (15) have at most one solution with respect to z. Because fQ is
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independent of zQ, it is sufficient to show that H( f ,z) is strictly monotonic for every
z ∈ (0,1). We first consider penalties. A straightforward computation yields
∂
∂ z
H( f ,z) =
n−1
(1− f )(1− zn−1)2
[zn−2− ( f +(1− f )z)n−2((1− f )+ f zn−2)]
=
(n−1)zn−2
(1− f )(1− zn−1)2
×
[
1−
{(
f +(1− f )z
z
)
((1− f )+ f z)
}n−2 (1− f )+ f zn−2
((1− f )+ f z)n−2
]
.
(16)
We note that(
f +(1− f )z
z
)
((1− f )+ f z)= 1+ f (1− f )
(
z−2+
1
z
)
= 1+ f (1− f )
(1− z)2
z
> 1,
(17)
and
(1− f )+ f zn−2
((1− f )+ f z)n−2
≥ 1. (18)
This inequality obviously holds for n = 2. By induction for every larger n, if it holds
for n, it must hold for n+1 because
(1− f )+ f zn+1
((1− f )+ f z)n+1
−
(1− f )+ f zn
((1− f )+ f z)n
=
f (1− f )(1− z)(1− zn)
((1− f )+ f z)n+1
> 0. (19)
Consequently, the square bracketed term in the last line of Eq. (16) is negative. Thus,
∂H( f ,z)/∂ z < 0 for every z ∈ (0,1). We now consider rewards and use the same
argument as above. This concludes our proof of the uniqueness of Q.
For n > 2, as δ increases, Q splits off from R (with xR = fQ) and moves across
the state space along the line given by Eq. (14) and finally exits this space through
N. The function H decreases with increasing z, and the right-hand side of Eq. (15)
decreases with increasing δ , which implies that zQ increases with δ . By substituting
Eq. (13) into Eq. (15), we find that the threshold values of δ for Q’s entrance (z = 0)
and exit (z = 1) into the state space are respectively given by
δs =
c
1+B+ · · ·+Bn−1
and δ s =
c
1+B
, (20)
where B = fQ(p) (and s = p) under penalties, and B = 1− fQ(r) (and s = r) under
rewards. We note that δ− < δs ≤ δ
s < δ+, which is an equality only for n = 2.
3.3 The saddle point Q
We next prove that for n > 2, Q is a saddle point. We first consider penalties using
Eq. (11). Because the square brackets in Eq. (11) vanish at Q, the Jacobian at Q is
Institutional incentives in optional public good games 9
given by
JQ=


δ f (1− f )
(
H + f
∂H
∂ f
)
δ f 2(1− f )
∂H
∂ z
z(1− z)
[
−A+δ
(
(1−2 f )H + f (1− f )
∂H
∂ f
)]
δ f (1− f )z(1− z)
∂H
∂ z


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Q
,
(21)
where H = H( f ,z) and A = (r−1)c+δ . Using ∂H( f ,z)/∂ z < 0, H > 0, and A > 0,
which yields
detJQ = δ f
2(1− f )z(1− z)[A+δ f H( f ,z)]
∂H( f ,z)
∂ z
< 0. (22)
Therefore, Q is a saddle point.
We next consider rewards using Eq. (12). Similarly, we find that the Jacobian at
Q is given by
JQ=


δ f (1− f )
(
−H +(1− f )
∂H
∂ f
)
δ f (1− f )2
∂H
∂ z
−z(1− z)
[
A+δ
(
(1−2 f )H + f (1− f )
∂H
∂ f
)]
δ − f (1− f )z(1− z)
∂H
∂ z


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Q
,
(23)
where H = H(1− f ,z) and A is as in Eq. (21). Using ∂H(1− f ,z)/∂ z < 0, H > 0,
and A > 0, it follows again that detJQ < 0. Threrefore, Q is a saddle point.
3.4 Classification of global dynamics
Here, we analyze in detail the global dynamics using Eqs. (11) and (12), which are
well defined on the entire unit squareU = {( f ,z) : 0≤ f ≤ 1,0≤ z≤ 1}. The induced
mapping, cont : U → ∆, contracts the edge z = 1 onto the vertex N. Note that C =
(1,0) and D = (0,0) as well as both ends of the edge z = 1, N0 = (0,1) and N1 =
(1,1), are hyperbolic equilibria, except when each undergoes bifurcation (as shown
later). We note that the dynamic on the N1N0-edge is unidirectional to N0 without
incentives.
First, we examine penalties. From Eq. (11), the Jacobians at C and N0 are respec-
tively given by
JC =
(
c−nδ 0
0 −[(r−1)c−σ ]
)
and JN1 =
(
c−2δ 0
0 (r−1)c−σ
)
. (24)
From our assumption that (r− 1)c > σ , it follows that if δ < c/n, then detJC < 0,
and thus, C is a saddle point; otherwise, detJC > 0 and trJC < 0, and thus, C is a sink.
Regarding N1, if δ < c/2, N1 is a source (detJN1 > 0 and trJN1 > 0); otherwise, N1 is
a saddle (detJN1 < 0). Next, the Jacobians at D and N0 are respectively given by
JD =
(
−(c−nδ ) 0
0 σ +δ
)
and JN0 =
(
−(c−nδ ) 0
0 −(σ +δ )
)
. (25)
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If δ < c, D is a saddle point (detJD < 0), and N0 is a sink (detJN0 > 0 and trJN0 < 0);
otherwise, D is a source (detJD > 0 and trJD > 0), and N0 is a saddle point (detJN0 <
0).
We also analyze the stability of R. As δ increases from c/n to c, the boundary
repellor R= (xR,0) enters the CD-edge at C and then moves to D. The Jacobian at R
is given by
JR =


δxR(1− xR)
∂
∂ f
f H( f ,z)
∣∣∣∣
R
∗
0 −rcxR+(c+σ)

 . (26)
Its upper diagonal component is positive because ∂H( f ,z)/∂ f ≥ 0 and H > 0, whereas
the lower component vanishes at xR = fQ(p) = (c+σ)/(rc). Therefore, if fQ(p) <
xR < 1, R is a saddle point (detJR < 0) and is stable with respect to z; otherwise, if
0< xR < fQ(p), R is a source (detJR > 0 and trJD > 0).
In addition, a new boundary equilibrium S= (xS,1) can appear along the N1N0-
edge. Solving f˙ (xS,1) = 0 in Eq. (11) yields xS = (c−δ )/δ ; thus, S is unique. S is a
repellor along the edge (as is R). As δ increases, S enters the edge at N1 (for δ = c/2)
and exits it at N0 (for δ = c). The Jacobian at S is given by
JS =


δxS(1− xS)
∂
∂ f
f H( f ,z)
∣∣∣∣
S
∗
0 δx2S+(r−1)cxS−σ −δ

 . (27)
Again, its upper diagonal component is positive. Using xS = (c−δ )/δ , we find that
the sign of the lower component changes once, from positive to negative, as δ in-
creases from c/2 to c. Therefore, S is initially a source (detJS > 0 and trJS > 0) but
then turns into a saddle point (detJS < 0), which is stable with respect to z.
We give a full classification of the global dynamics under penalties, as follows.
1. For 0 ≤ δ < δ− (Fig. 2a), C and D are saddle points, N1 is a source, and N0 is
a sink. There is no other equilibrium, and f˙ < 0 holds in the interior state space.
All interior orbits originate from N1 and converge to N0. N0 is globally stable.
After applying the contraction map, we find that the interior of ∆ is filled with
homoclinic orbits originating from and converging to N.
2. As δ crosses δ− (Fig. 2b), C becomes a sink, and the equilibrium R enters the CD-
edge at C. R is unstable along that edge but is stable with respect to z. Therefore,
there is an orbit originating from N1 and converging to R that separates the basins
of attraction of C and N0. All of the orbits in the basin of N0 have their α-limits
at N1, as before. Hence, the corresponding region in ∆ is filled with homoclinic
orbits and is surrounded by a heteroclinic cycle N → R → D → N. However, if
the population is in the vicinity of N, small and rare random perturbations will
eventually send the population into the basin of attraction of C (as is the case for
c/2< δ ).
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Fig. 2 Optional public good games with institutional punishment. The triangles represent the state space
∆ = {(x,y,z) : x,y,z > 0,x+ y+ z = 1}. Its vertices C, D, and N correspond to the three homogeneous
states of cooperators (x = 1), defectors (y = 1), and non-participants (z = 1), respectively. The unit squares
represent an extended state space U = {( f ,z) : 0≤ f ≤ 1,0≤ z≤ 1} such that ∆ is its image according to
the mapping x = f (1− z), y = (1− f )(1− z), which is injective except for z = 1. The edge is contracted
to N. The vertices of U are denoted by C = (1,0), D = (0,0), N1 = (1,1), and N0 = (0,1). The stream
plot is based on Eq. (11). Dot and dashed curves inU denote where f˙ and z˙ vanish, respectively. aWithout
incentives, the interior of U is filled with orbits originating from N1 and then converging to N0, which
correspond to homoclinic cycles to fully cover the interior of ∆. b As δ increases, the equilibrium R
(a saddle point) first enters the CD-edge at C, which then becomes a sink. c When δ crosses c/2, the
equilibrium S (a source) enters the N1N0-edge at N1, which then becomes a saddle point. d When δ
crosses δp, the saddle point Q enters the interior of ∆ through R, which then becomes a source. Q traverses
U along a horizontal line. e When δ crosses δp, Q exits ∆ through S, which then becomes a saddle. For
larger values of δ , there is no such interior orbit that originates from the N1N0-edge and converges to
it, and thus, ∆ has no homoclinic cycle. When δ crosses δ+, R and S exit ∆ through D, which becomes
a source, and N0, which becomes a saddle. f For δ > δ+, the interiors of U and ∆ are filled with orbits
originating from D and converging to C. Parameters are the same as in Fig. 1: n = 5, r = 3, c = 1, σ = 0.5,
and δ = 0 (a), 0.25 (b), 0.51 (c), 0.55 (d), 0.7 (e), or 1.2 (f)
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3. As δ crosses c/2 (Fig. 2c), N1 becomes a saddle point, and a new equilibrium S
enters the N1N0-edge at N1. S is a source. As δ increases, S moves toward N0.
If c/2 < δp holds, then for c/2 < δ < δp, there is still an orbit originating from
S and converging to R that separates the state space into basins of attraction of C
and N0. All of the orbits in the basin of N0 have their α-limits at N1, as before.
In ∆, the separatrix NR and the NC-edge now intersect transversally at N, and the
entrance of a minority of participants (including cooperators and defectors) into
the greater population of non-participants may be successful.
4. As δ crosses δp (Fig. 2d), the saddle point Q enters the interior of ∆ through
R, which becomes a source. Based on the uniqueness of Q and the Poincare´-
Bendixson theorem ([52], Appendix A), we can see that there is no such homo-
clinic orbit originating from and converging to Q, and the unstable manifold of
Q must consist of an orbit converging to C and an orbit converging to N0; the
stable manifold of Q must consist of an orbit originating from D and an orbit
originating from S (or, in the case that δp < c/2, from N1 for δp < δ < c/2).
The stable manifold separates the basins of attraction of C and N0; the unstable
manifold separates the basin for N0 into two regions. One of them is filled with
orbits originating from S (or from N1 under the above conditions) and converging
to N0. For ∆, this means that the corresponding region is filled with homoclinic
orbits and is surrounded by a heteroclinic cycle N → Q → N (Fig. 2d). As δ
further increases, Q moves across U , from the CD-edge to the N1N0-edge along
the line f = fQ(p). For n = 2, R and S undergo bifurcation simultaneously, and
the linear continuum of interior equilibria, which connects R and S, appears only
at the bifurcation point (Fig. 4a).
5. As δ crosses δ p (Fig. 2e), Q exits the state space through S, which then becomes
saturated. For larger values of δ , there is no longer an interior equilibrium. S is a
saddle point, which is connected with the source R by an orbit leading from R to
S.
6. Finally, as δ crosses δ+ (Fig. 2f), R and S simultaneously exit U , through D and
N0, respectively. For δ+ < δ , N1 and N0 are saddle points, D is a source, and C is
a sink. f˙ > 0 holds throughout the state space. All of the interior orbits originate
from D and converge to C. Hence, C is globally stable.
Let us now turn to rewards. From Eq. (12), the Jacobians at D and N0 are
JD =
(
−(c−nδ ) 0
0 σ
)
and JN0 =
(
−(c−2δ ) 0
0 −σ
)
. (28)
If δ < c/n, D is a saddle point (detJD < 0); otherwise, D is a source (detJD > 0
and trJD > 0). Regarding N0, if δ < c/2, N0 is a sink (detJN0 > 0 and trJN0 < 0);
otherwise, N0 is a saddle point (detJN0 < 0). Meanwhile, the Jacobians at C and N1
are
JC =
(
c−δ 0
0 −[(r−1)c−σ +δ ]
)
and JN1 =
(
c−δ 0
0 (r−1)c−σ +δ
)
. (29)
From (r−1)c> σ−δ , it follows that if δ < c, C is a saddle point (detJC < 0), and N1
is a source (detJN1 > 0 and trJN1 > 0); otherwise, C is a sink (detJC > 0 and trJC < 0),
and N1 is a saddle point (detJN1 < 0).
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We also analyze the stability of R. As δ increases from c/n to c, the boundary
attractor R enters the CD-edge at D and then moves toward C. The Jacobian at R is
given by
JR =


−δxR(1− xR)
∂
∂ f
(1− f )H(1− f ,z)
∣∣∣∣
R
∗
0 −rcxR+σ

 . (30)
Its upper diagonal component is negative because ∂H(1− f ,z)/∂ f ≤ 0 and H > 0,
and the lower component vanishes at xR = fQ(r) = σ/(rc). Therefore, if 0 < xR <
fQ(r), R is a saddle point (detJR < 0) and unstable with respect to z; otherwise, if
fQ(r) < xR < 1, R is a sink (detJR > 0 and trJR < 0).
Similarly, a boundary equilibrium S can appear along the N1N0-edge. Solving
f˙ (xS,1) = 0 in Eq. (12) yields xS = 1− (c− δ )/δ , and thus, S is unique. S is an
attractor along the edge (as is R). As δ increases, S enters the edge at N0 (for δ = c/2)
and exits at N1 (for δ = c). The Jacobian at S is
JS =


−δxS(1− xS)
∂
∂ f
(1− f )H(1− f ,z)
∣∣∣∣
S
∗
0 −[δx2S− ((r−1)c+2δ )xS+σ ]

 .
(31)
Again, its upper diagonal component is positive. Using xS = 1− (c− δ )/δ , we find
that the sign of the lower component changes once, from negative to positive, as δ
increases from c/2 to c. Therefore, S is initially a sink (detJS > 0 and trJS < 0) and
then becomes a saddle point (detJS < 0), which is unstable with respect to z.
A full classification of the global dynamics under rewards is as follows.
1. For 0 ≤ δ < δ− (Fig. 3a), C and D are again saddle points, N1 is a source, and
N0 is a sink. f˙ < 0 holds in the interior state space, and all of the interior orbits
originate from N1 and converge to N0. The interior of ∆ is filled with homoclinic
orbits originating from and converging to N.
2. As δ crosses δ− (Fig. 3b), D turns into a source, and the saddle point R enters the
CD-edge through D. There exists an orbit originating from R and converging to
N0. In contrast to the case with penalties, N0 remains a global attractor. A region
separated by the orbit RN0 encloses orbits with N1 as their α-limit. Therefore, in
∆, the corresponding region is filled with homoclinic orbits that are surrounded
by a heteroclinic cycle N→ C→ R→ N.
3. As δ crosses c/2, N0 becomes a saddle point, and the equilibrium S enters the
N1N0-edge at N0. S is a sink (and thus, a global attractor). As δ increases, S
moves to N1. If c/2< δr holds, then for c/2< δ < δr, there exists an orbit orig-
inating from R and converging to S, which separates the interior state space into
two regions. One of these regions consists of orbits originating from N1, corre-
sponding in ∆ to a region filled with homoclinic orbits. The other region consists
of orbits originating from D. In ∆, the separatrix RN and the NC-edge intersect
transversally at N.
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Fig. 3 Optional public good games with institutional rewards. Notations are as in Fig. 2, and the stream
plot is based on Eq. (12). a Without incentives, this figure is same as Fig. 1a. b As δ increases, the
equilibrium R (a saddle point) first enters the CD-edge at D, which then becomes a source. c When δ
crosses δr, the saddle point Q enters the interior of ∆ through R, which then becomes a sink. Q traverses
U along a horizontal line. d When δ crosses c/2, the rest point S (a sink) enters the N1N0-edge at N0,
which then becomes a saddle point. e When δ crosses δ r, Q exits U through S, which then becomes a
saddle point. For larger values of δ , there is no such interior orbit that originates from the N1N0-edge
and converges to it and, thus, ∆ has no homoclinic cycle. When δ crosses δ+, R and S exit ∆ through C,
which becomes a sink, and N1, which becomes a saddle. f For δ > δ+, the interiors of U and ∆ are filled
with orbits originating from D and then converging to C, as in the case with institutional punishment. The
parameters are the same as in Figs. 1 and 2, except δ = 0 (a), 0.25 (b), 0.35 (c), 0.52 (d), 0.7 (e), or 1.2 (f)
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4. As δ crosses δr (Fig. 3d), the saddle point Q enters the interior state space through
R, which then becomes a sink. There is no homoclinic loop for Q, as before, and
now, we find that the stable manifold of Q must consist of two orbits originating
from D and N1. The unstable manifold of Q must consist of an orbit converging
to R and another converging to S or, in the case that δr < c/2, converging to N0
for δr < δ < c/2 (Fig. 3c). The stable manifold separates the basins of attraction
of R and S (or N0 under the above conditions); the unstable manifold separates
the basin for S (or N0) into two regions. One of these regions is filled with orbits
issuing from N1 and converging to S (or N0). The corresponding region in ∆ is
filled with homoclinic orbits and is surrounded by a heteroclinic cycle N→ Q→
N (Figs. 3c and 3d). As δ continues to increase, Q moves through U , from the
CD-edge to N1N0, along the line f = fQ(r). For n= 2, R and S undergo bifurcation
simultaneously, and the continuum of interior equilibria, which connects R and
S, appears only at the bifurcation point (Fig. 4b).
5. As δ crosses δ r (Fig. 3e), Q exits the state space through S, which then becomes
a saddle point. For larger values of δ , there is no longer an interior equilibrium.
S is connected with the sink R by an orbit from S to R. All of the interior orbits
converge to R.
6. Finally, as δ crosses δ+ (Fig. 3f), R and S simultaneously exit U through C and
N1, respectively. Just as in the case with punishment, for δ+ < δ , N1 and N0 are
saddle points, and D is a source. Finally, C is a sink. f˙ > 0 holds throughout the
state space. All of the interior orbits originate from D and then converge to C.
Hence, C is globally stable.
4 Discussion
We considered a model for the evolution of cooperation through institutional incen-
tives and analyzed in detail evolutionary game dynamics. Specifically, based on a
public good game with optional participation, we fully analyzed how opting-opt im-
pacts game dynamics; in particular, opting-out can completely relax a coordination
problem associated with punishment for a considerably broader range of parameters
than in cases of compulsory participation.
We start from assuming that there is a state-like institution that takes exclusive
control of individual-level sanctions in the form of penalties and rewards. In our ex-
tended model, nobody is forced to enter a joint enterprise that is protected by the
institutional sanctioning, however, whoever is willing to enter, must be charged at
the entrance. Further, if one proves unable or unwilling to pay, the sanctioning insti-
tution can ban that person from participation in the game. Indeed, joint ventures in
real life are mostly protected by enforceable contracts in which members can freely
participate, but are bound by a higher authority. For example, anyone can opt to not
participate in a wedding vow (with donating to the temple or church), but once it is
taken, it is the strongest contract among enforceable contracts. As far as we know,
such higher authorities always demand penalties if contracts are broken.
Based on our mathematical analysis, we argue that institutional punishment, rather
than institutional rewards, can become a more viable incentivization scheme for coop-
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Fig. 4 Optional public good games with institutional incentives for n = 2. Notations are as in Fig. 2, and
the stream plot is given under (a) penalties based on Eq. (11) and (b) rewards based on Eq. (12). Other
parameters include c = 1, σ = 0.5, and r = 3 (a) or 1 (b). For n = 2, the state space may have an interior
equilibrium, which is a linear continuum of the equilibria, only at δ = 2/3. a Under penalties, the fixed
line that connects N (S in U) and R is repelling with respect to f and divides ∆ into basins of attraction of
N (N0 in U) and C. From the vicinity of N, arbitrarily small random perturbations will send the state into
the region of attraction of C. b Under rewards, the fixed line is attracting with respect to f , and thus, the
interior orbits converge to corresponding points on the line
eration when combined with optional participation. We show that combining optional
participation with rewards can complicate the game dynamics, especially if there is
an attractor with all three strategies: cooperation, defection, and non-participation,
present. This can only marginally improve group welfare for a small range of per
capita incentive δ , with δ− < δ < δr (Fig. 3b). Within this interval, compulsory par-
ticipation can lead to partial cooperation; however, optional participation eliminates
the cooperation and thus drives a population into a state in which all players exit.
Hence, freedom of participation is not a particularly effective way of boosting coop-
eration under a rewards scenario.
Under penalties, the situation varies considerably. Indeed, as soon as δ > δ− (Fig.
2b), the state in which all players cooperate abruptly turns into a global attractor for
optional participation. When δ just exceeds δ−, group welfare becomes maximum
(r−1)c−σ . Meanwhile, for compulsory participation, almost all of the (boundary)
state space between cooperation and defection still belongs to the basin of attraction
of the state in which all players defect. Because δ = c/n, where n is the group size,
and c is the net contribution cost (a constant), when n is larger, the minimal institu-
tional sanctioning cost δ− to establish full cooperation is smaller.
There are various approaches to equilibrium selection in n-person coordination
games for binary choices [54–56]. A strand of literature bases stochastic evolution
models [57–59], in which typically, a risk-dominant equilibrium [60] that has the
larger basin of attraction is selected through random fluctuation in the long run. In
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contrast, considering optional participation, our model typically selects the cooper-
ative equilibrium which provides the higher group welfare, even if the cooperative
equilibrium has the smaller basin of attraction when participation is compulsory than
has the defective equilibrium. In the sense of favoring the efficient equilibrium, our
result is similar to that found in a decentralized partner-changing model proposed by
Oechssler [61], in which players may occasionally change interaction groups.
Throughout centralized institutional sanctions mentioned so far, norm-based co-
operation is less likely to suffer from higher-order freeloaders, which have been prob-
lematic in modeling decentralized peer-to-peer sanctions [2,62]. In addition, it is clear
that sanctioning institutions will stipulate a lesser antisocial punishment targeted at
cooperators [63], which can prevent the evolution of pro-social behaviors ([64,65],
see also [36]). Indeed, punishing cooperators essentially promote defectors, who will
reduce the number of participants willing to pay for social institutions. For self-
sustainability, thus, sanctioning institutions should dismiss any antisocial schemes
that may lead to a future reduction in resources for funding the institution.
Thus, we find that our model reduces the space of possible actions into a very
narrow framework of alternative strategies, in exchange for increasing the degree of
the institutions complexity and abstractiveness. In practice, truly chaotic situations
which offer a very long list of possibilities are unfeasible and create inconvenience,
as is described by Michael Ende in “The Prison of Freedom” [1992]. Participants in
all economic experiments usually can make their meaningful choices only in a short
and regulated list of options, as is the way with us in real life. Our result indicates
that a third party capable of exclusively controlling incentives and membership can
play a key role in selecting a cooperative equilibrium without ex ante adjustment. The
question of how such a social order can emerge out of a world of chaos is left entirely
open.
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Appendix A
First, we prove that a homoclinic loop that originates from and converges to Q does
not exist. Using the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem [52] and the uniqueness of an in-
terior equilibrium, we show that if it does exist, there must be a point p inside the
loop such that both of its α- and ω-limit sets include Q. This contradicts the fact that
Q is a saddle point. Indeed, there may be a section that cuts through Q such that the
positive and negative orbits of p infinitely often cross it; however, it is impossible for
a sequence consisting of all the crossing points to originate from and also converge
to the saddle point Q. Hence, there is no homoclinic orbit of Q.
Next, we show that orbits that form the unstable manifold of Q do not converge
to the same equilibrium (indeed, this is a sink). If they do, the closed region that is
surrounded by the orbits must include a point q such that its ω-limit set is Q. Using
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the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem and the uniqueness of an interior equilibrium, the
α-limit set for q must include Q; this is a contradiction. Similarly, we can prove that
the orbits that form the stable manifold of Q do not issue from the same equilibrium.
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